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Abstract
We discuss a time invariant policy which delivers the unconditionally
optimal outcomes in purely forward-looking models and Ramsey outcomes
in purely backward-looking models. This policy is a product of interaction
between two institutions with distinct responsibilities. Motivated by Brendon
and Ellison (2015), we think of them as arms of government. One institution
is responsible for forward guidance, setting rules which are necessary
and su¢ cient to determine private expectations. The second institution
implements optimal policy taking expectations as given. The forward guidance
rules are designed to maximise the unconditional expectation of the social
objectives.
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1 Introduction
Ramsey policy is time inconsistent in models with forward-looking behaviour (Kyd-
land and Prescott, 1977). That is because the government can a¤ect the economy
via its current and future actions. Future policy inuences current outcomes via an
expectations channel, whilst current policy only a¤ects the economy contemporane-
ously. Therefore the optimal policy at period zerois di¤erent from future optimal
policy. That property of optimal Ramsey rules is known as time inconsistency and
typically implies that it will not be optimal for policymakers to make good on policy
promises when the time arrives to deliver on those promises.
To deal with time inconsistency, two types of time invariant rules are often consid-
ered in the literature. The rst analyses policies which maximise the unconditional
expectation of the social objective (unconditionally optimal, or UO, policy) proposed
by Taylor (1979).1 The second analyses policies that are optimal from a Timeless
Perspective (TP policy) introduced by Giannoni and Woodford (2002), which as-
sumes commitment to Ramsey policy designed many periods ago. Commitment to
these invariant rules is tantamount to assuming that institutions have been devised
which deliver the outcomes associated with these rules although that assumption is
rarely, if ever, made explicit. We discuss this issue in a little more detail below.
In many cases UO and TP policies perform very similarly. Indeed, Blake (2001)
and Damjanovic, Damjanovic and Nolan (2009) proved that TP can be converted to
UO policy if the government were accounting for all generations equally: that is if it
sets the social discount rate equal to zero. Nevertheless, TP and UO policies have
important theoretical and sometimes quantitative di¤erences and neither obviously
dominates the other.
On the one hand, TP policy can lead to non-stationary outcomes in models with
forward-looking constraints (Blake and Kirsanova, 2004; Benigno and Woodford,
2012). In particularly, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) demonstrate that TP pol-
icy results in non-stationary dynamics of government debt. Unlike the TP, the UO
policy implies stationarity by design, since any non-stationarity would result in in-
nitely large expected value of the loss function2. Moreover, TP policy may put an
unreasonably large weight on a relatively distant event in the past, which is not the
case for UO policy (Jensen and McCallum, 2010).
1Since then, unconditional welfare optimisation has been widely used in the literature. Whiteman
(1986), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1998), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Erceg, Henderson
and Levin (2000), Kollman (2002) and McCallum (2005) are some prominent examples.
2Horvath (2011) has shown that government debt dynamics are stationary when UO policy is
implemented
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On the other hand, TP policy has a number of attractive features in models
with only backward looking constraints. Thus, it coincides with Ramsey optimal
discretionary policy. That is not the case for UO policy which requires a commitment
device even in purely backward looking models. And whilst it is true that the UO
policy would dominate TP policy conditional on the fact that all generations had
followed it in the past, since the current generation would have had a better start in
terms of economic environment3, even in this case, it is still optimal for the current
generation to deviate towards TP. Therefore, there is a sense in which TP policy is
more stable and could be preferable in models with backward-looking constraints.
As UO policy performs better in forward-looking models whilst TP/Ramsey pol-
icy is sometimes more desirable in backward-looking models, the question is which
policy to use if an economy has both types of constraints. In this paper we discuss a
time invariant policy which inherits properties of the TP policy in backward-looking
and UO in forward-looking models. We will call this policy UO-Ramsey. Our paper
shows an easy, intuitive and transparent way to design such a policy.
Following Brendon and Ellison (2015) we consider a little more explicitly the
issue of institutional design. In particularly, policies are designed by two authori-
ties with distinct and distinctive responsibilitieswe think of these two authorities as
arms of government. One arm of government ("outer" government in Brendon and
Ellison), is responsible for forward guidance4. The outer government makes promises
and determines private expectations about future policy outcomes. The second arm
of government ("inner" government) implements policy taking promises and corre-
sponding private expectations as given. In this framework, expectations are taken as
exogenous and therefore cannot be changed by the inner government. As the inner
government cannot use the expectations channel to a¤ect the economy, the inner
policy maker does not face any problem related to time consistency.
Our main contribution compared to Brendon and Ellison (2015) is that we pro-
pose an alternative way to design the problem of the forward-guiding outer govern-
ment, which is responsible for expectations formation. In this paper we show that
the outer government maximises the unconditional expectations of social objectives.
Hence, although the policy outcome is the same as Brendon and Ellison (2015), our
approach serves to illuminate the fundamental objectives of the outer government in
3According to Ramsey (1928), discounting future generations welfare is unethical. See also Pigou
(1932), who thought that private discount rates are excessive. For a detailed discussion about the
advantages of UO policies in backward-looking models Damjanovic, Damjanovic and Nolan (2015).
4In terms of monetary policy, forward guidance is dened as communication about the likely
future course of monetary policy and the FOMC began using forward guidance in its post-meeting
statements in the early 2000s. Since then forward guidance has attracted attention among academics
and policymakers. See for example Svensson (2014).
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an intuitive and transparent way.
After presenting the design of UO-Ramsey policy, we consider two interesting
applications. In the rst one we design UO-Ramsey policy in a linear-quadratic
model with a so-called hybrid Phillips curve. This case can easily be nested to either
the purely forward-looking new Keynesian model or to the purely backward-looking
model where Ramsey policy is time consistent. Our policy will deliver UO policy in
the rst case and Ramsey policy in the second.
Then we consider UO-Ramsey scal policy in a model with government debt. We
show that, in contrast to the TP policy, the UO-Ramsey policy implies a non-trivial
relationship between real variables and government debt.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes and explains the design
of UO Ramsey policy. Section 3 applies the UO-Ramsey policy to a linear-quadratic
model with hybrid Phillips curve. Section 4 discusses the UO-Ramsey scal policy
in an economy with debt. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Following Brendon and Ellison (2015) we introduce two arms of governments. The
rst makes promises about future policy outcomes which become part of the forward-
looking constraints of the policy problem. This may reect decisions by parliament or
the executive branch of government determining, say, the legal framework for mone-
tary policy (e.g., the ination target) or of an independent committee responsible for
forward policy guidance. Brendon and Ellison (2015) name that government "outer"
or "promise - making" government. The second arm of government maximises social
welfare choosing among the policy rules which are consistent with expectations about
promises. This is the "inner" government and it takes both promises and expecta-
tions as given. Note, that without an assumption of forward-looking behaviour, there
will be no scope for outer government as nothing will depend on expectations. On
the other hand, if all constraints were forward looking, "inner" government would
have no choices to make; it will be completely constrained by the promises made
by "outer" government. The inner government takes promises as exogenous con-
straints which have to be respected. Within that framework, inner government has
no power to alter expectations, and from its perspective, the environment is purely
backward-looking and there is no problem with time inconsistency. Therefore, the
inner government acts as a fully e¤ective Ramsey policymaker whose actions are
credible and time consistent.
The actions of the outer government are easy to describe: it makes promises
which maximise the unconditional expectation of the social welfare function.
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2.1 Formal set up
Consider a model where social welfare is the discounted stream of utilities,
W = E0
1X
t=0
tu(xt):
There are certain dynamic constraints described as
xt = F (xt 1; xt; Etxt+1; t) ; (1)
where xt is a vector of endogenous variables, including policy tools, and t is an
exogenous shock,  is the policymakers time discount factor. Following Brendon and
Ellison (2015) we decompose constraint (1) into its forward-looking and backward-
looking parts. The expectations part will be managed by the outer, promise-making,
government. The promise-making government sets state-dependent promises about
all variables which are included in the expectations part of (1). That promise is in
the form Etxt+1 = !t+1: In other words, we will replace constraint (1) with
xt = F (xt 1; xt; Et!t+1; t) ; (2)
xt = !t: (3)
The inner government will be responsible for setting xt but will take promises
!t as given. The inner government will not be able to a¤ect the economy through
the expectations channel and will treat expectations as exogenous. Therefore their
optimisation problem has no forward looking part and their fully optimal Ramsey
policy will be time-consistent. Up to that step, we follow Brendon and Ellison (2015).
Formally, the Lagrangian for the inner government is
V (!) = max
xt
E0
1X
t=0
t fu(xt) + t [ xt + F (xt 1; xt; Et!t+1; t)] + t (xt   !t)g : (4)
And the rst order condition is
@V
xt
= u0(xt)+t

 1 + @
xt
F (xt 1; xt; Et!t+1; t)

+Ett+1
@
xt
F (xt; xt+1; Et+1!t+2; t)+t = 0:
(5)
Our contribution is to suggest that the promise-making government should set promises
!t in such a way that they will maximise the unconditional expectation of the social
value function. So the problem of the outer government is
max
!
J = EuV (!) ; (6)
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where Eu denotes the unconditional expectation. Plugging in the value function of
the outer government, we get
J = max
!
Eu
 1X
t=0
t fu(xt) + t [ xt + F (xt 1; xt; Et!t+1; t)] + t (xt   !t)g
!
:
Applying the UO maximisation algorithm in Damjanovic, Damjanovic and Nolan
(2008) we obtain the rst order condition for the promise-making government
@J
@!t
= t 1
@
!t
F
 
xt 2; xt 1; !t; t 1
  t = 0: (7)
The policy we propose solves problem (6), subject to constraints (2, 3). The
solution satises the rst order conditions (5), and (7). In purely backward looking
models it coincides with Ramsey-optimal policy. In purely forward-looking models
it coincides with UO policy. The next section shows that result in a transparent way
using a model that has been popular in applied monetary policy analysis.
3 Hybrid Phillips Curve
In this section we show how to derive the UO Ramsey policy in a model with a hybrid
Phillips curve. The government has a conventional loss function which consists of
output and ination gap terms
min
t;yt
L =
X
t
 
2t + y
2
t

: (8)
The behaviour of the private sector is described by a hybrid Phillips curve:
t = yt + (1  )Ett+1 + t 1 + t; (9)
where  is the discount factor of the private sector and t is an exogenous cost-push
shock.
Let st denote the state of the economy which consists of the history of exogenous
shocks. To design an UO Ramsey policy the outer government creates a menu of
state-dependent promises about future ination
(st) = !(st): (10)
Then, the Hybrid Phillips curve is transformed into
t = yt + (1  )Et!t+1 + t 1 + t; (11)
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where promise !t is given by the outer government and taken as an exogenous variable
by the inner government. The inner government minimises loss (8) taking promises
as given. The Lagrangian is
J = min
!t
E
"
min
t;yt
+1X
t=0
()
t 1
2
 
2t + y
2
t

+ t ( !t + yt + (1  )Et!t+1 + t 1 + t) + t (!t   t)
#
:
The rst-order conditions for inner government are
() t
@J
@t
= t + Ett+1   t = 0; (12)
() t
@J
@yt
= yt + t = 0: (13)
Now the outer government needs to minimise the unconditional expectation of loss
(8) subject to private behaviour and beliefs (11), and the promise-keeping condition
(10). To solve it we follow Damjanovic, Damjanovic and Nolan (2008) who show
that UO policy is similar to TP/Ramsey policy if the government time discount rate
is set equal to zero ( = 1). The rst-order condition for outer government is
@J
@!t
=  t + (1  )t 1 + t = 0: (14)
The combination of (12), (13) and (14) results in the following combined policy
rule
t =  (Etyt+1   yt) + (1  ) (yt 1   yt) :
Table 1 compares UO, Ramsey and UO-Ramsey policies for an economy with a
hybrid Phillips curve. As can be seen, UO-Ramsey policy is identical to UO policy
when the Phillips curve is purely forward-looking ( = 0); and it coincides with the
Ramsey policy for the backward-looking case ( = 1):
Table 1. The optimal monetary policy from di¤erent perspectives
Backward-looking Forward-looking
Phillips curve t = yt + t 1 + t t = yt + Ett+1 + t
Ramsey/ TP t = Eyt+1   yt t =  yt 1   yt
UO t = Eyt+1   yt t = yt 1   yt
UO-Ramsey t = Eyt+1   yt t = yt 1   yt
Hybrid Phillips Curve
Phillips curve t = (1  )Ett+1 + t 1 + yt + t
Ramsey/ TP t = (1  )



yt 1   yt

+  (Eyt+1   yt)
UO t = (1  ) (yt 1   yt) +  (Eyt+1   yt)
UO-Ramsey t = (1  ) (yt 1   yt) +  (Etyt+1   yt)
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4 UO-Ramsey policy and government debt
It is well known that the TP approach to optimal policy results in non-stationary
behaviour of government debt. In contrast, debt is stationary when UO policy is
adopted (Horvath, 2011). Since UO-Ramsey policy involves unconditional optimisa-
tion, it has to result in a stationary outcome as in UO case. That is simply because
a non-stationary policy will result in an innitely large value of the loss function.
In the following example we show that TP policy provides no role for public debt
in the optimal consumption program whilst UO-Ramsey policy implies a negative
relation between consumption and debt.
Consider the following simple model where households maximise utility
E0
1X
t=0
t (U(Ct)  V (Nt)) : (15)
subject to the budget constraint
Ct +Bt = Rt 1Bt 1 + (1   t)WtNt; (16)
where Et denotes the expectations operator at time t,  is the discount factor, Ct
is consumption and Nt and Wt are labour and wage respectively. The household
decides how much to save in the form of government bonds, Bt, with risk free return
Rt, given wage Wt and income tax  t. The necessary conditions for an optimum
include:
V 0 (Nt) = (1   t)WtU 0(Ct); (17)
and
RtEtU
0(Ct+1) = U 0(Ct): (18)
Then Governments policy problem can be written as the maximisation of (15)
subject to the set of constraints
U 0(Ct) RtEtU 0(Ct+1) = 0; (19)
CtU
0(Ct) +BtU 0(Ct) = Rt 1Bt 1U 0(Ct) + V 0 (Nt)Nt; (20)
F (Ct; Nt; At) = 0: (21)
Here, (20) is combination of (16) and (17); formula (21) denotes all the remaining
equations where At is a vector of all remaining variables.
In the appendix we show that the resulting rst order conditions with respect to
consumption are di¤erent across the TP (22) and UO-Ramsey (23)) approaches:
U 0(Ct)   [U 00(Ct)Ct + U 0(Ct)] + tFc (Ct; Nt; At) = 0; (22)
U 0(Ct)   [U 00(Ct)Ct + U 0(Ct)  (1  )Rt 1Bt 1U 00(Ct)] + tFc (Ct; Nt; At) = 0: (23)
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TP policy implies that optimal consumption does not depend on debt and this
is why debt follows the random walk as shown by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
In contrast, the UO-Ramsey policy stabilises debt since the marginal utility of con-
sumption is positively related to debt, which implies that consumption is smaller
when government debt is larger.
5 Conclusion
We present a policy (UO Ramsey) which behaves as Ramsey optimal policy in
backward-looking models, but is similar to UO policy in forward looking models.
We demonstrate how that policy works by considering two examples. First we show
that in a linear-quadratic model with a hybrid Phillips curve the policy delivers the
Ramsey policy when price setting is purely backward-looking, while it is the same
as UO policy when the Phillips curve is purely forward-looking. Second, we show
that UO-Ramsey scal policy implies lower consumption when government debt is
higher.
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6 Appendix: TP vs. UO-Ramsey policy in an
economy with debt
The Lagrangian for the TP policy problem is:
max
Rt+1;Nt+1;Ct+1;Yt+1
JTP = E0
1X
t=0
tf(U(Ct)  V (Nt))
 E0
1X
t=0
tt (CtU
0(Ct) +BtU 0(Ct) Rt 1Bt 1U 0(Ct) + V 0 (Nt)Nt)
+E0
1X
t=0
tt (U
0(Ct) RtEtU 0(Ct+1))
+E0
1X
t=0
ttF (Ct; Nt; At) :
The rst order conditions follow in a straight forward way:
@J
@Bt
Bt =  tU 0(Ct)Bt + t+1RtBtU 0(Ct+1) = 0;=) t = :
@J
@Rt
=  tRtEtU 0(Ct+1) + t+1BtRtU 0(Ct+1) = 0;=) t = Bt;
@J
@Ct
= U 0(Ct)   (U 00(Ct)Ct + U 0(Ct) + (Bt  Rt 1Bt 1)U 00(Ct))
+ (Bt  Bt 1Rt 1)U 00(Ct) + tFc (Ct; Nt; Yt) ;
@J
@Nt
= V 0(Nt) +  (V 00(Nt)Nt + V 0(Nt)) + tFn (Ct; Nt; At) :
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In turn, these can be simplied as follows:
U 0(Ct)  
 
U 00(Ct)Ct + U 0(Ct)

+ tFc (Ct; Nt; At) = 0; (24)
V 0(Nt) + 
 
V 00(Nt)Nt + V 0(Nt)

+ tFn (Ct; Nt; At) = 0; (25)
U 0(Ct) RtEtU 0(Ct+1) = 0; (26)
Fn (Ct; Nt; At) = 0; (27)
Bt  Rt 1Bt 1   V
0 (Nt)
U 0(Ct)
Nt + Ct = 0: (28)
As we asserted in the main text, system (24-27) does not depend on debt and solves
for all endogenous variables. The last equation (28) is autonomous and describe the
dynamics of debt, which is clearly non-stationary as Rt 1 > 1:
6.1 UO-Ramsey
As proposed by Brendon and Ellison, we replace forward-looking Euler equations
with promise-making and promise-keeping constraints,
U 0(Ct) RtEtU 0(!t+1) = 0;
Ct = !t:
Now we solve the inner governments problem taking promises as exogenous variables
max
Rt+1;Nt+1;Ct+1;Yt+1
JIN = E0
1X
t=0
tf(U(Ct)  V (Nt))
 E0
1X
t=0
tt (CtU
0(Ct) +BtU 0(Ct) Rt 1Bt 1U 0(Ct) + V 0 (Nt)Nt)
+E0
1X
t=0
tt (U
0(Ct) RtEtU 0(!t+1))
 E0
1X
t=0
tt (Ct   !t))
+E0
1X
t=0
ttF (Ct; Nt; At)
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The rst-order conditions for the inner government in equilibrium imply
@JIN
@Bt
Bt =  tU 0(Ct)Bt + t+1RtBtU 0(Ct+1) = 0;=) t = ;
@JIN
@Rt
=  tRtEtU 0(Ct+1) + t+1BtRtU 0(Ct+1) = 0;=) t = Bt;
@JIN
@Ct
= U 0(Ct)   (U 00(Ct)Ct + U 0(Ct) + (Bt  Rt 1Bt 1)U 00(Ct))
+BtU
00(Ct)  t + tFc (Ct; Nt; Yt) ; (29)
@JIN
@Nt
= V 0(Nt) +  (V 00(Nt)Nt + V 0(Nt)) + tFn (Ct; Nt; At) :
The outer government will choose promises to maximise the unconditional expecta-
tion of the inner governments problem. We use the same technique as Damjanovic,
Damjanovic and Nolan (2008) to obtain the rst order condition with respect !t.
t = Bt 1Rt 1U
00(Ct):
Combining this with (29) we get
U 0(Ct)  
 
U 00(Ct)Ct + U 0(Ct) + (Bt  Rt 1Bt 1)U 00(Ct)

+ (Bt   Bt 1Rt 1)U 00(Ct) + tFc (Ct; Nt; At) = 0: (30)
This in turn may be simplied to obtain
U 0(Ct)   (U 00(Ct)Ct + U 0(Ct)  (1  )Rt 1Bt 1U 00(Ct)) + tFc (Ct; Nt; At) = 0: (31)
This expression (31) is di¤erent from the corresponding expression (24) for TP op-
timisation and explains the di¤erence in debt dynamics across thee di¤erent policy
programs.
13
